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Animal Spirits and Organisation 
 
Introduction 
Are animal spirits our best hope of getting economies out of the doldrums? And is this a 
core feature of the revival of Keynesian economics?  
 The crisis has drawn attention to a range of Keynesian concerns and Keynesian 
solutions which had lain in abeyance during the Great Moderation and beyond. Notably, 
the ability of the market system to equilibrate has again been open to question and the 
need for fiscal intervention recognised. But retrenchment is now well underway on both 
fronts. The arguments now that market forces have simply been temporarily impeded and 
that fiscal activism is misguided are replaying previous episodes of mainstream critique 
of Keynes. Arguably the success of this retrenchment is due to the fact that the Keynesian 
case has been weakened because of the widespread inattention to Keynes for all these 
years. This has meant, not only ignorance of much of the content of Keynes’s ideas (e.g. 
with respect to the very long run), but more fundamentally that there is little 
understanding of the system of thought within which Keynesian concerns and policy 
solutions emerged and therefore of what they mean.  
 The purpose of this paper is to argue that the concept of animal spirits is a prime 
example of this phenomenon of apparently Keynesian concepts meaning something very 
different within a mainstream framework and therefore losing their power. By drawing 
instead on Keynes’s framework and on other compatible frameworks it will be argued 
that animal spirits can be embedded in both theory and policy in a fruitful way. Engaging 
with animal spirits should be part of a policy mix designed to promote a level and 
composition of investment to support a full-employment level of effective demand as a 
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long-run strategy, not just temporary crisis management. The paper builds on and extends 
the analysis in Dow and Dow (2012) on animal spirits. 
 Animal spirits now feature in some rational expectations models as well as in 
public discourse (Davidson 2009: 111-2). Because, understood as a spontaneous urge to 
action, animal spirits are incompatible with the rationality axioms, they are exogenous to 
the mainstream theoretical system and treated as a random shock (see e.g. Farmer 2013). 
The implication is that animal spirits are a macro phenomenon – a discrete shift in 
expectations across the board. Their generalisation across the macroeconomy is explained 
by their self-fulfilling nature as the system lurches temporarily away from equilibrium. 
The initial shift in expectations is unexplained, but as a disturbing force it is regarded as 
damaging.1 Nevertheless much hope in public discourse has been placed in such a shift 
occurring to lift the economy out of its slump (implicitly restoring the economy to long 
run equilibrium). But since they are treated as exogenous in the mainstream literature, no 
attempt is made to discuss how animal spirits could be influenced by policy. 
 But animal spirits are not widely discussed in non-mainstream circles either. 
Because they cannot be explained in terms of rationality (in the mainstream sense), 
animal spirits are generally classified as psychological and understood in individualistic 
terms (even if aggregated up to a macro phenomenon). Animal spirits may seem therefore 
to be a subjective surface phenomenon detached from real experience and real causal 
mechanisms. This understanding is reinforced by the impression that government efforts 
to rouse animal spirits in a climate of austerity amount simply to ‘spin’. 
 But part of the power of mainstream economics is to define concepts in its own 
terms. The case of ‘rationality’ is the most obvious, and is highly pertinent to our 
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understanding of animal spirits, which Davidson (1994: 26) classifies as being based on 
‘reasonable expectations’ rather that rational expectations. Equally pervasive is the 
tendency to understand concepts in dualistic terms. By analysing animal spirits instead in 
terms of Keynes’s own framework, it will be argued in this paper that they are embedded 
in a Keynesian theory of knowledge and action; the rationality/psychology dichotomy of 
mainstream economics is inappropriate (see further Dow 2011). Further it will be argued 
that animal spirits are neither exclusively macro nor exclusively individual. Rather, while 
leaving room for human agency, we will focus on the social and organisational 
(structural) aspects of animal spirits which will provide a basis for policy to nurture and 
harness them in a constructive way. A key element of this discussion is to recognise the 
integral inter-relations between animal spirits and knowledge as the basis for action.  
 Having distinguished our approach from the mainstream association of animal 
spirits with irrationality, we focus on the fact that, while animal spirits can make up for 
lack of knowledge, and confidence in knowledge, they also condition knowledge and the 
confidence held in it. Knowledge and animal spirits are thus interdependent. Insofar as 
policy can enhance knowledge and confidence in knowledge, it will strengthen animal 
spirits. Strong animal spirits may in fact disguise the role they play in all non-routine 
action. Thus for example the asset price boom was presumed at the time to be rational. 
But while the norm is not for animal spirits to fly in the face of reason and evidence; they 
may do so if the decision-making is delusional. Such unreasonable animal spirits will 
eventually tend to lead to business failure; an example of generalised failure arising from 
such delusion is the financial crisis which emerged from 2007. 
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 The next section sets out a Keynesian account of animal spirits. The emphasis 
here is on developing the concept for modern application rather than as an exercise in the 
history of economic thought. The aim is therefore to extend the analysis of Marchionatti 
(1999), Dequech (2005), and Dow and Dow (2011) (see also Dow 2013a). In principle 
the Keynesian concept of animal spirits has general application. While Keynes used it to 
refer to the motivation for business investment, here we extend the analysis not only to 
innovation but also (as in Dow and Dow 2011) to behaviour in the financial sector. The 
analysis could be extended further to the household sector, and in particular to behaviour 
with respect to the housing market. Such an analysis would enrich our drawing on the 
animal spirits concept for understanding the financial and economic crisis.  
But here we simplify the analysis by restricting attention to the business and 
financial sectors and focusing only on two polar contexts. On the one hand we consider 
animal spirits with respect to expanding capacity; these fluctuate with unsubstantiated, or 
spontaneous, optimism, perceived uncertainty and changing dispositions. On the other 
hand we consider animal spirits with respect to the commitment to innovate (in new 
forms of organisation, technologies, techniques, practices, products and markets). These 
arise from the more longstanding dispositions of organisations and individuals. Animal 
spirits in both the senses are shown to be influenced by structural factors which are open 
to policy management. A critical factor to be explored for both is the capacity to ignore 
uncertainty (building on Dow 2013b). The discussion of the long run will include 
discussion of Keynes’s ideas on the socialisation of investment, building on Chick and 
Dow (2013). 
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Animal Spirits in a Keynesian Framework 
In The General Theory, animal spirits are a critical determinant of business investment 
and their weakness can account for an economy being unable to get out of a slump 
(Davidson 2009: 60-4). Keynes (1936: 161) defined animal spirits as ‘a spontaneous urge 
to action rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted average of 
quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities’. Because he understood the 
market economy to be an open organic system, Keynes viewed the past as only a limited 
guide to the future. To help society cope in the face of the resulting uncertainty, 
institutions and social practices evolve to provide a more stable environment for decision-
making, within which reason and evidence need to be combined with other sources of 
(uncertain) knowledge: conventional knowledge and the knowledge of experts (Keynes 
1937). But even then, ‘individual initiative will only be adequate when reasonable 
calculation is supplemented and supported by animal spirits’ (Keynes 1936: 162). Indeed 
in Keynes’s framework behaviour which ignores the limitations on calculative rationality 
would itself be irrational (Kregel 1987).  
 Starting from Dequech’s (1999: 420, n.12) overarching definition of animal spirits 
as ‘the optimistic disposition to face uncertainty’, we focus on the three interrelated 
variables which contribute to this mental state: the expectations themselves (optimism or 
pessimism), the confidence held in them (the perceived degree of uncertainty) and the 
underlying disposition (with respect to action under uncertainty).  
 
Optimism:  
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As far as expectations are concerned strong animal spirits take the form of spontaneous 
optimism, i.e. optimism which is not fully warranted by reason and evidence, to a degree 
which reflects the degree of uncertainty. While conventional knowledge can be 
understood as human logic applied to reason and evidence (as a social rather than 
individualistic phenomenon), Keynes (1936: 162) went further in identifying the 
importance for animal spirits of the more amorphous notion of the ‘political and social 
atmosphere’, a factor which Marshall and Schumpeter also identified as important for the 
investment decision. In discussing the relevance of atmosphere for animal spirits, 
Marchionatti (1999: 431) identifies it with the ‘rules of the social game’, based on a 
shared ideology or ‘mental model’. This aspect of animal spirits is thus embedded in 
expectations formation. 
 
Perceived uncertainty:  
Uncertainty in the Knightian sense arises from the absence or inaccessibility of 
quantifiable probabilities. But for Keynes some judgements could normally be made, at 
least about ordinal probabilities. Further uncertainty was a matter of degree, which 
depends inversely on the weight of argument, a function of the amount of relevant 
knowledge relative to relevant ignorance.2 The identification of relevance in turn requires 
some kind of mental model. Keynes’s theory of probability was objective in the sense 
that any judgement is based on the evidence available to the decision-maker – anyone 
else in exactly the same position would judge the same. But it was subjective in that that 
position conditions judgement, so that the perception of uncertainty will vary with 
context. Thus the ‘rules of the social game’ and the ‘mental model’ will also influence the 
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weight of argument (and the perception of relevance on which it is based) and the degree 
of uncertainty admitted. Evidence within one ‘mental model’ may point to a high degree 
of uncertainty which may be ignored as irrelevant by another. Yet there is scope for 
perceived uncertainty to change, not just because new evidence affects the actual degree 
of uncertainty but because it also changes the perception of uncertainty if it challenges 
the prevailing mental model. Thus for example the current crisis dramatically increased 
awareness of the extent of reasonable uncertainty.  
 
Disposition to face uncertainty:  
This characteristic of being willing to act in spite of uncertainty is commonly associated 
with entrepreneurs, as an enduring disposition. Keynes considered the entrepreneurs who 
characterised ‘old-fashioned capitalism’ to have a particular capacity or disposition 
towards action. These are ‘individuals of sanguine temperament and constructive 
impulses who embarked on business as a way of life’ and who take ‘satisfaction (profit 
apart) in constructing a factory, a railway, a mine or a farm’ (Keynes 1936: 150).3 This 
disposition may be institutionalised within organisations which give it a strategic priority, 
such that it becomes an institutional disposition. The disposition to face uncertainty 
cannot be separated from the rules of the social game or the mental model which we saw 
conditioning the perception of uncertainty, so that changes within organisations can 
impact on the disposition to act in the face of uncertainty. The disposition to face 
uncertainty can apply also in areas other than physical production, notably the financial 
sector.4 But the financial sector is commonly described as being particularly averse to 
uncertainty, i.e. lack the disposition to face uncertainty. Fluctuating animal spirits in the 
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financial sector may therefore be accounted for more by changing degrees of optimism or 
pessimism and changing perceptions of uncertainty (low when expectations are optimistic 
and high when they are pessimistic) than by changing dispositions to face uncertainty. 
 
Implications 
There are some important implications of this characterisation of the constituent variables 
of animal spirits which we will carry forward in the discussion to follow. First, since 
Keynes’s theory of knowledge is general (in building on the generality of uncertainty), 
the role of animal spirits is potentially also general.5 The implication is that non-routine 
action requires the exercise of animal spirits, in whatever context.  
 Second, animal spirits are not additive with respect to knowledge, but rather 
condition how that knowledge is understood in relation to an urge to act. In other words, 
animal spirits are not added in to the decision-making process after a view is formed 
about the nature and degree of the uncertainty to be admitted. Rather the content of 
expectations, the perceived uncertainty surrounding them and the willingness to act in 
spite of uncertainty are all interdependent. For Keynes knowledge as the basis for action 
therefore requires input which could be classified variously as emotional or 
psychological; indeed motivation itself is grounded in emotion (see further Dow 2011). 
Emotion and cognition are not independent. Further the relationship works both ways, 
since real experience influences emotion (e.g. if it reveals new realms of ignorance) 
 Third, animal spirits are therefore not purely psychological, nor are they 
necessarily individualistic, but rather involve an interplay between agency and structure. 
There is scope for disaggregating the nature and role of animal spirits according to 
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different functional groupings in the economy, as well as to different times and places, 
and different time-frames (Shackle 1974; Kregel 1987). Not only does structure set the 
parameters for decision-making processes and thus the exercise of agency, but it also 
determines which social game, which conventional understanding and which mental 
model are being applied to a particular context. In what follows we will consider in 
particular the implications for animal spirits of the evolution of industrial structure and of 
the structure of finance.  
 Animal spirits are endogenous to structure but also to conjuncture. We will 
therefore consider animal spirits within different contexts. First we consider the decision 
to invest in capital with a view to expanding capacity, where animal spirits vary primarily 
with expectations with respect to effective demand and perceived uncertainty. Then we 
consider innovation, where new products, techniques, markets and organisational 
structures are being contemplated and uncertainty is therefore more apparent (although 
perception of it may also be variable) and the enduring disposition to face it is more 
important. In each case we consider animal spirits and how they might be managed for 
policy purposes. 
 
Animal Spirits and Business Investment 
Keynes focused his discussion of animal spirits on entrepreneurial action in the form of 
new capital investment, which was critical for getting economies out of a slump 
Davidson (2009: 60-4). He had noted that the relative decline of owner-managership of 
companies meant a reduced incidence of the business way of life (Gerrard 1994: 16). 
This implies a change in the structural environment for the exercise of animal spirits from 
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the mental model and social norms of the lone entrepreneur to those of the business 
organisation. While individuals may still exercise agency within organisations, the 
character of animal spirits changes.  
 Indeed in business organisations the role of animal spirits may not be fully 
acknowledged. In chapter 11 of The General Theory, Keynes set out a ‘rational’ basis for 
capital investment by comparing the marginal efficiency of capital (mec) with the rate of 
interest. But then in chapter 12 he developed the role of animal spirits as the crucial 
element of the investment decision in the face of uncertainty which lies outside rational 
calculation. Chapter 12 portrayed the real basis for the decision while chapter 11 
portrayed the rationalisation. As Keynes (1937: 114) put it in his later distillation of The 
General Theory: ‘How do we manage … to behave in a manner which saves our faces as 
rational, economic men? … [W]e largely ignore the prospect of future changes about the 
character of which we know nothing.’6  
 Rationalisation within the organisation is compounded by rationalisation directed 
at the source of funding. In chapter 12 of The General Theory Keynes contrasted the 
investment plans of business, based on long-term expectations, with the short-term 
expectations of the financial sector as the source of funding. Publicly-quoted companies 
were dependent on short-termist market valuations of investment opportunities which 
constrained their capacity to follow their own long-term valuations (and their animal 
spirits). Since then this effect of the growing incidence of publicly-quoted companies has 
been compounded by two further notable developments: the rising incidence of 
remuneration by stock options (Lazonick 2009) and the rising incidence of in-house 
treasury departments which have shifted the focus of these companies from capital 
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investment to financial investment. Over time therefore short-termism has spread into 
business organisations themselves. Animal spirits urging action on capital investment are 
competing within large firms with the animal spirits urging financial speculation. Even if 
the former dominate, it is necessary for these animal spirits to be shared by the stock 
market, in the case of publicly-quoted companies, and banks in the case of smaller 
companies if funding is to be attracted.  
If animal spirits increasingly go unacknowledged within non-financial business, 
this is even more the case within the financial sector. But, while financial markets are 
commonly understood to be capable of pricing risk (eliminating uncertainty), in fact 
investment analysis and bank risk assessment both involve the critical element of 
judgement, with a strong input from conventional judgment.7 But the conviction that was 
widespread before the current crisis, reinforced by mainstream finance theory, was that 
unquantifiable risk was not relevant. If there is no perception of uncertainty then animal 
spirits are thought not to be relevant to action which can be based on apparently purely 
rational argument. But experience suggests otherwise, as in the case of the dotcom 
bubble. Building on analysis of that episode as one example, Tuckett (2011) explores the 
emotional fixation by players in financial markets on expectations of gains which 
increasingly departed from reason and experience. Financial markets have shown their 
capacity to act in spite of uncertainty which has not been recognised, on the basis of 
widespread conventional judgement which contradicts reason and experience (an 
irrational pursuit of what is misunderstood as rationality). Positive animal spirits operate 
through the low perception of uncertainty. 
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 In the meantime, retail banks had traditionally handled uncertainty by building up 
over a long period substantial expertise in making judgements about default risk with 
respect to well-known clients.8 Taking on that default risk even then required the banks to 
share the urge to action of the borrower, on the basis of judgment. But structural change 
in finance as a result of deregulation dating from the 1970s eroded the ‘originate-and-
hold’ model, centralised the lending decision such that the importance of the local 
knowledge base was downplayed, and shifted the focus of banks’ attention to markets in 
securities and derivatives. The banks’ actions increasingly took on the short-termist 
character of the markets in which they were increasingly involved. The exercise of banks’ 
animal spirits thus increasingly took the form of acquiring investments based on 
overblown expectations of returns on assets for which the knowledge base was weak, 
followed by sudden reversals.9 The reversal of animal spirits following the onset of crisis 
(due to a high degree of pessimism and a high perception of uncertainty) took the form of 
a marked unwillingness to extend loans to small and medium sized business, putting a 
major brake on the latter’s animal spirits. The attempt to increase liquidity through 
quantitative easing has come up against the failure of the banks to empathise with the 
animal spirits of the non-financial sector. Targeted government lending schemes have a 
better chance of success. 
 While in boom times real and financial investment decisions are portrayed as 
rational, without input from animal spirits, the central importance of animal spirits 
becomes apparent when they falter and fade in a recession, discouraging investment. The 
Keynesian policy for addressing a failure of animal spirits with respect to expanding 
capacity requires increasing the confidence of non-financial firms in their expectations 
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through a commitment to sustain effective demand, a commitment supported by public 
works. But it also increasingly requires attention to the structure of the financial sector 
and the scope for its animal spirits to follow a different path from the animal spirits of 
business investors or indeed to infect business investors with short-termism. Recent 
research on economic and financial mental states suggests that positive animal spirits can 
be captured in the indicator ‘excitement’ and negative animal spirits in the indicator 
‘anxiety’; these in turn can be measured by quantitative discourse analysis of media texts 
(Tuckett et al 2013).  
 The animal spirits applied to investing in increased capacity are evidently the 
product of the onset of unsubstantiated optimism conditioning expectations and to low 
perceived uncertainty attached to those expectations. But the structural changes we have 
discussed here have indicated a secular shift in terms of the disposition to face 
uncertainty. This was already evident in Keynes’s day with the reduced role of the 
traditional entrepreneur who was characterised by a relatively strong disposition to face 
uncertainty. But it has been exacerbated, not only by changes within industrial 
organisation, but also by structural changes in the financial sector, all of which have 
increased the significance for animal spirits of the financial sector’s unwillingness to act 
in the face of uncertainty that is perceived.  When a crisis dramatically increases the 
perception of uncertainty, the effect on animal spirits and thus on capital investment is 
accordingly more dramatic. 
 
Animal Spirits and Innovation  
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Animal spirits are important for urging action on increasing the level of investment, 
because of uncertainty about the level of effective demand; Keynes’s proposal for the 
socialisation of investment was addressed partly to sustaining aggregate demand, thus 
providing a more secure basis for conjunctural animal spirits. But when considering the 
composition of investment a major concern for ensuring continued capacity for growth is 
investment in innovation; innovation may be directed at new technologies, new 
production techniques, markets, products and organisational structures. The relevant time 
frame for expectations can vary from relatively short, as when the financial sector 
introduces a new derivative product to very long, which is the context of innovation in 
alternative sources of energy, for example. Keynes was concerned about the danger that 
the return on capital investment would fall such that a policy which succeeded in 
promoting a general increase in investment would be wasteful (meeting demand for 
luxuries rather than basic needs) without addressing the need for full employment and a 
more equitable distribution of income. As argued in Chick and Dow (2013) the critical 
issue then is the role of the state in steering, not only the level, but also the composition 
of investment.  
 Even within the organisational structure of his own time Keynes was pessimistic 
about the outcome of firms’ investment decisions, not only with respect to scale of 
production but also with respect to innovation. He had concluded that private sector 
investment had proved itself incapable of ensuring full employment, so that capital 
satiety might be reached in the very long run without full employment being achieved. A 
failure of animal spirits in the face of uncertainty was a major element in bringing this 
about. But his policy of state involvement in investment was thus addressed to the 
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‘economic problem’ of making adequate provision for general enjoyment of the Good 
Life (Keynes 1930a), not just the stabilisation policy currently commonly defined as 
Keynesian (Seccarreccia 1995).10 He was not advocating nationalisation, but rather that: 
in many cases the ideal size for the unit of control and organisation lies 
somewhere between the individual and the modern State. I suggest, therefore, that 
progress lies in the growth and the recognition of semi-autonomous bodies within 
the State – bodies whose criterion of action within their own field is solely the 
public good as they understand it, and from whose deliberations motives of 
private advantage are excluded ... . (Keynes 1926: 288)  
By definition innovation involves more uncertainty than does investment to change the 
level of output. If the latter, in Shackle’s terms, is a ‘crucial experiment’ how much more 
so is innovation? Further, while capital investment addressed to expanding capacity 
requires a push from animal spirits for it to be ‘taken off the shelf’, innovation requires a 
push from animal spirits to initiate a process of developing new technology, processes 
and products, where expectations as to outcomes evolve as the innovation process 
proceeds. The uncertainty surrounding the level of demand in the first case is of a lesser 
order than the uncertainty surrounding innovation. Further, the critical time for animal 
spirits to be exercised is at the beginning of the lengthy innovation process, not at the 
point of deciding whether or not to implement an investment project in order to increase 
the scale of production. Finally, since there is less pretence than in other contexts that 
there is no uncertainty and thus no need for animal spirits, the ‘disposition to face 
uncertainty’ is more directly acknowledged as an important factor. Even so this 
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disposition is now largely a character of organisations and a product of the social, 
political and economic atmosphere, rather than the sole preserve of the maverick 
individual.  
 Since the literature on innovation11 places such importance on epistemological 
issues arising from the inherent uncertainty surrounding the innovation process, it seems 
that there is significant scope for considering innovation as a particular action to which 
animal spirits are relevant. Indeed Terzi (1999: 16-7) draws a parallel between animal 
spirits and Schumpeter’s urge to innovate. Schumpeter (1934), like Keynes, depicted 
entrepreneurs as pro-active in innovation, going beyond rationality in taking steps for 
which the outcome was uncertain (Hagedoorn 1996). Further he carried the character of 
entrepreneurship over into behaviour even within large joint-stock companies (see further 
Langlois 1996).  But he envisaged the entrepreneurial function gradually being overtaken 
by increasingly routine innovation practices, diminishing the role of animal spirits. There 
is a long tradition of discriminating between routine and non-routine decision-making 
according to whether or not the range of possible outcomes and the connection between 
choice and outcome are treated as known. Even innovation may fall into the first category 
when it is regarded as routine rather than creative (see e.g. Simon 1958). 
 Schumpeter saw large joint-stock companies as having a greater evidence base 
and greater cognitive skills in projecting returns on investment than smaller, owner-
managed companies, as well as having greater market power. Partly this difference must 
be a matter of scale and organisation; the institution of the firm is itself a mechanism for 
addressing uncertainty. As Coase (1937: 22) put it ‘It seems improbable that a firm would 
emerge without the existence of uncertainty’ (see further Loasby 1976), and the larger the 
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firm the greater the scope for internalising the potential for uncertainty. The better the 
knowledge base and the less the exposure to disturbing external forces the more secure 
the basis for action and thus, apparently, the less important the role of animal spirits. As 
Lazonick (2013) argues further, a successful innovating enterprise will adopt an 
appropriate strategy and be organised in such a way as to transform its cost structure and 
shape market demand, thus reducing uncertainty. But large firms’ strategies may not 
produce the desired outcome.  
 While the literature on entrepreneurship encourages an individualistic 
understanding of animal spirits, even in small firms individuals draw on the social 
atmosphere to which Keynes refers. The general emotional state, and therefore animal 
spirits, even within a large firm may be encouraged by effective leadership (see Wallis, 
Dollery and Crase 2009). But animal spirits in a large company are generally12 not of the 
individualistic sort associated with the traditional entrepreneur, but rather embedded in 
the firm’s mission statement and expressed in the form of business strategy and in 
conventional or routine behaviour. Conversely, individual creativity within a firm may be 
suppressed by internal struggles over resources. Or it may be discouraged by a climate of 
fear over career prospects because of the potential for failure which is part and parcel of 
innovation. Indeed business innovation strategy requires some framework or another by 
which to plan under uncertainty, or as Dosi (1982) argues, a firm needs to build its 
Kuhnian paradigm, which of course may reflect a wider industry paradigm or mental 
model. This plan may or may not make good provision for R&D. More generally 
Dequech (1999) notes the role of social conditioning in forging animal spirits.13  
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 Marshall had focused on the importance of industrial organisation for 
entrepreneurship (Marchionatti 1999). The success of the industrial district form of 
organisation which Marshall advocated was due in large part to the social, political and 
economic atmosphere which Schumpeter, like Keynes, had also highlighted. Marshall’s 
industrial districts allow a productive atmosphere for innovation as a positive externality. 
A positive atmosphere can promote innovation by encouraging spontaneous optimism, 
i.e. optimism not justified by rationalist logic. It can also discourage a focus on the 
uncertainties of knowledge. A negative atmosphere on the other hand can discourage 
innovation by breeding spontaneous pessimism, increased awareness of uncertainty and 
increased uncertainty aversion. Nelson and Winter’s (1982) evolutionary approach 
similarly places the role of individuals and their animal spirits within organisations, 
whose structure is important for outcomes. They emphasise the importance of routines in 
large organisations as part of an evolutionary process which influences the path of 
technological change. The structure of industrial organisation (firm size, firm age, 
corporate governance etc.) is therefore important for the scope and character of animal 
spirits.  
 In accordance with this approach, Earl and Potts (2011) have developed an 
insightful line of argument focusing on the internal structure of organisations. They 
demonstrate that the conflict which Keynes had identified between the short-term 
calculations of financial markets and the long-term plans of entrepreneurs is now 
increasingly playing out within organisations in the internal relations between the 
accounting function and the R&D function. Where the accounting function is given 
precedence, the animal spirits of the R&D function are suppressed. The accounting 
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concern is predominantly with productivity and profitability in the short term. The 
concern of the creative R&D function is with exploring imagined possibilities which may 
prove to be fruitless. While management may be motivated to facilitate and encourage 
R&D with a view to long-term profitability, the psychological motivation of the 
innovator may accord more closely with Kelly’s (1955) vision of the hypothesis tester 
whose concern is with making imagined possibilities into a reality. This vision has much 
in common with Smith’s (1795) argument that the philosopher is motivated to alleviate 
the psychological disturbance caused by unexplained events, by means of the imagination 
(see further Skinner 1979). 
 It was Shackle’s (1979: 26) view that uncertainty was endemic in innovation 
which creates new imagined possibilities (even if they prove in the end to be impossible). 
Successful innovations may well be the unintended consequence of an investigation 
based on uncertain expectations of a quite different outcome, where the process of 
innovation and the learning it entails itself change the underlying conditions. That 
outcomes cannot be controlled is evident, e.g. in the information technology sector 
which, as Janeway (2013: 79) argues, illustrates that it is often not the large, broad-based 
firms with innovation strategies which end up taking the lead in innovation. The 
disposition to act in spite of uncertainty which we associate with the traditional 
entrepreneur may be more evident in smaller companies where personal leadership and 
R&D are less constrained. 
While we have considered reasons why firm size might be seen as a mechanism 
for reducing uncertainty, and reducing dependence of providers of finance with short 
time-horizons, Keynesian epistemology indicates that animal spirits are an essential 
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ingredient in all non-routine action. Uncertainty therefore still prevails for large 
companies, though its source may differ from one context to another. Schumpeter had 
seen the role of animal spirits in innovation being reduced with changes in industrial 
structure and the organisation of firms. Loasby (1999: 146) argues that Schumpeter’s 
uncertainty differs fundamentally from Keynesian uncertainty in that it refers to the 
discovery of pre-existing, but hitherto unrecognised, possibilities, along the lines 
developed by Kirzner (1985). This contrasts with Loasby’s (2011) own analysis of the 
entrepreneur, and of the entrepreneurial function within large organisations, which draws 
on Smith’s division of labour in knowledge as well as in practice, as well as his emphasis 
on the imagination. The innovator in theory, and by implication in practice, pursues new 
ideas primarily (according to Smith) through making new connections 
 We identify this disposition to innovate as an enduring contribution to animal 
spirits, although fluctuations in expectations and the perception of uncertainty will cause 
animal spirits to vary. This disposition makes for a more enduring core of animal spirits 
in contrast to the animal spirits which fluctuate with the state of optimism and of 
confidence (for which indicators of excitement and anxiety provide evidence). 
Considering this disposition in terms of the individual, Smith (1776: I.2.4) argued that 
apparently innate characteristics in fact arise primarily from environment and experience: 
‘The difference between the most dissimilar characters, between a philosopher and a 
common street porter, for example, seems to arise not so much from nature as from habit, 
custom, and education’. As Loasby (1991: ch. 6) argues, innovation requires this learned 
disposition to be applied to defying the logic of the system within which it occurs. He 
therefore argued for innovators within the firm to be given greater latitude than other 
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employees (Loasby 1999: 28). Nevertheless some organisational structure and shared 
understandings are required for firms to function effectively; institutional stability and 
continuities in knowledge are preconditions for new connections to be made, i.e. for 
innovation. In order to foster innovation therefore Loasby (1991: 101) argues that what is 
required is ‘rational structures and rational procedures, rather than rational choice’. 
Successful structures and procedures will encourage an institutional disposition to face up 
to uncertainty. 
 Addressing the disposition to innovate and the internal organisation of firms is 
only part of the picture; individual entrepreneurs and firms of all sizes function within a 
national institutional framework with its own systems of ‘habit, custom and education’. 
Accordingly animal spirits in the sense of the disposition to innovate have for long been 
actively encouraged by national systems of innovation (Nelson ed., 1992, McKelvey 
1994). While these systems may involve direct government activism in the form of 
promoting particular sectors, they consist more generally of the kind of ‘semi-
autonomous bodies’ which Keynes had advocated, including universities.  
 A major additional factor has been the need to provide finance in the absence of 
sufficient private sector financial support. The structure and regulation of the financial 
sector and its relations with the real sector are thus important. While financial institutions 
may (or may not) share the animal spirits of firms deciding to increase capital investment 
in order to increase the scale of production, animal spirits in the form of a disposition to 
innovate are a different matter altogether. Financial institutions themselves are notable 
innovators in their own techniques, products and practices, and in this sense they exercise 
animal spirits on their own behalf. But they are less sanguine about financing the highly 
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uncertain exploratory R&D activity of their debtors.14 Animal spirits in the sense of 
disposition to finance the innovation of others are only relevant to specialist financial 
institutions which aim to pick winners and finance their start-ups with venture capital, but 
even venture capitalists focus on a relatively short time horizon within which to earn their 
return, relying on animal spirits in the stock market to push the value of their investments 
above what may reasonably be expected in the long term (see e.g. Janeway 2013: 130-
1).15 As Keynes had argued, the financial sector is more strongly governed by the 
conventional understandings of markets than non-financial business. 
 The process of innovation itself is wasteful in that, being by its nature uncertain, 
most attempts will not succeed; the process is one of conjecture and refutation. Given the 
long time-frame for major innovation projects and the huge amounts of capital involved, 
the evidence suggests that the disposition to act in spite of the resulting uncertainty is 
generally lacking. The state has therefore had to underpin developments in key sectors 
such as biotech. Janeway (2013) demonstrates how the state has therefore for a long time 
played a central role in supporting the innovation process because of, rather than in spite 
of, that waste.16 (This waste is different from the waste of unemployed factors by which 
Keynes characterised a recession.) National innovation systems generally involve a large 
element of state subsidy, often indirectly, e.g. through the education system, but also 
directly addressed to particular R&D activities (Mazzucato 2013). But, as Lazonick and 
Mazzucato (2012) point out, it is the private sector providers of finance to innovating 
organisations which reap the rewards. As discussed above, Keynes was concerned that 
capital satiety would be reached before full employment and an equitable distribution of 
income were assured and that the animal spirits of business would be inadequate to 
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ameliorate this outcome; this was the case both for animal spirits over the cycle but also 
for enduring animal spirits in the form of the disposition to innovate in spite of 
uncertainty. His advocacy of further state involvement would logically imply, not only 
favouring innovation to support improved standards of living with an eye to the ultimate 
goal of the Good Life, but a more equal distribution of those benefits so that the Good 
Life would be open to all. While the rate of profit is falling, a maldistribution of 
employment and income means that the necessary conditions for the Good Life are 
absent for many. 
 
Conclusion 
We have been considering animal spirits as an urge to action whose strength varies with 
how much uncertainty is perceived and the disposition to act in spite of that perception. 
The distinction has been drawn between animal spirits which vary as the perception of 
uncertainty changes and animal spirits as an enduring disposition to act in spite of 
uncertainty.  
 Animal spirits are necessary to encourage investment in a slump, and yet that is 
when they are weakest. The policy implications are that action may be taken either to 
strengthen animal spirits or to circumvent them with public sector investment. In fact the 
latter is the best route to the former. If the perception of uncertainty about the economic 
future is high, governments can act to reduce that perception by a public commitment to 
stabilising effective demand backed up by public works – an improvement in the political 
and economic atmosphere.17 The public mood is based on conventional judgements 
which draw in varying degrees on reason and experience, and the perception of 
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uncertainty is an important element in those judgments. In contrast, if animal spirits are 
simply understood as irrational emotion the implication is that they can be manipulated 
accordingly. But from the perspective of animal spirits developed here, government 
‘spin’ which has little support in reason or experience is a flimsy basis on which to aim to 
strengthen animal spirits. 
 Not only have animal spirits largely been ignored in economic theory, they are 
also generally unacknowledged in economic life until they falter. Yet strong animal 
spirits can create problems when they reflect unacknowledged uncertainty to the extent of 
delusion. Thus for example as the size of business organisation increases, institutional 
rigidities and rigidities in understanding may become more evident. Then not only 
uncertainty but evidence may be ignored, deluding decision makers (as discussed by Earl 
1984). Where uncertainty is unacknowledged (and thus animal spirits are strong), a 
decision to increase the scale of production while ignoring the fact that competitors have 
developed superior technologies is delusional.  It is similarly delusional, while ignoring 
uncertainty, to invest in opaque structured products whose prices are rising. While this 
behaviour is the product of strong animal spirits, it is generally presented as a rational 
choice, but with potentially catastrophic consequences when it is conventional behaviour 
across the financial sector. It is therefore important to understand animal spirits when 
they are strong as well as when they are weak, and to develop policies to curb them when 
they fly in the face of reason and evidence, including reason and evidence with respect to 
uncertainty. Our analysis implies that policy directed at changing social norms and social 
understandings within the financial sector, as well as a better understanding of 
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uncertainty, could dampen unreasonable animal spirits, fending off the next speculative 
boom.  
 Strong animal spirits in the sense of the longstanding disposition to innovate are 
less likely to be problematic, but are unlikely to be strong enough without state support. 
Weak animal spirits in this context are problematic and require a different policy 
approach. Given the endemic multiple uncertainties associated with innovation, we have 
focused here on innovative activity as an area where animal spirits are critical and where 
the consequences for economic growth are most important. The state has long known that 
it needs to support innovation because private sector finance in general is reluctant to 
support it alone. Indeed given the complex nature of national institutional structures it is 
impossible to think of extricating the role of the state. We have seen that animal spirits 
are not a pure psychological phenomenon but, in this context, are the product of 
innovation systems which extend from Adam Smith’s ‘habit, custom, and education’ to 
the structure of large organisations, all of which are amenable to influence from 
government. That involvement in turn gives the state the opportunity to steer innovation 
in socially-useful directions and to distribute the fruits of successful innovation more 
widely. 
 
 
 
Notes 
1. General equilibrium theory requires some exogenous variable to explain movement 
away from long-run equilibrium. While the money supply was for a long-time identified 
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for this role, it was replaced by real shocks in real business cycle theory. Now some are 
identifying some form of irrationality (uncertainty or animal spirits) as the source of 
shocks. 
2. See further Dequech (2005) and Dow (1995) on uncertainty perception and weight of 
argument. 
3. The idea was current in the 1930s when Keynes was writing that entrepreneurs 
displayed particular characteristics (see Matthews 1984.) 
4. Bearing in mind a definition of uncertainty as unquantifiable risk, it is interesting to 
note that the current discourse on remuneration classifies individuals within companies as 
‘material risk takers’ who are compensated accordingly (see for example Financial 
Stability Board 2012). 
5. Coddington (1982) correctly identified the general rationale for the role of animal 
spirits as applying potentially to all decision making. But his conclusion was that, if all 
decision-making were indeterminate as a result of exogenous influences on expectations, 
then macroeconomics would collapse into nihilism.  
6. See further Dow (1991). 
7. Tuckett, Chong, and Ruatti (2012) demonstrate the importance of convincing 
narratives for market valuation and investment decisions by fund managers. 
8. Tellingly, bank lending was traditionally based on character as a more sound indicator 
of default risk than on project assessment. 
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9. This behaviour characterised the 1980s debt crisis and the 1990s S E Asia crisis, as 
well as the current crisis. 
10. Keynes was advocating the socialisation of investment as early as 1926, in ‘The End 
of Laissez-faire’, and returned to the argument in the Treatise on Money: ‘Perhaps the 
ultimate solution [to the best balance between consumption and investment] lies in the 
rate of capital development becoming more largely an affair of state, determined by 
collective wisdom and long views’ (Keynes 1930b: 145). 
11. See for example Loasby (1999), Lazonick and Mazzucato (2012), Janeway (2013). 
12. Individual agency can sometimes be critical, as in the case of notable corporate 
leaders. 
13. See also Gillies (2003) on the intersubjectivity of long-term expectations. 
14. Innovation in the financial sector itself is arguably of a different sort from the more 
exploratory process of innovation in the production sector, involving less uncertainty. 
15. See further Janeway (2012) for an account of the evolution of venture capital 
philosophies and practices. 
16. John Rae (1834) was an early advocate for state support of innovation as the 
precondition for the division of labour. 
17. The debate about the effect of Keynesian policy in the UK in the postwar period is 
due to the difficulty of assessing how far private sector investment was strengthened by 
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the government commitment to maintain full employment, a commitment which was 
credible even without significant public works. 
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